I
HAVE to address you to-night on the subject of "Democracy and Economic Affairs." It isa platitude that we are living in critical and responsible times; critical because the problems can be held up} while we are discussing them, only to a limited extent. So many of the probl~ms in the past have perhaps improved while they have been discussed; those of the pres en t could easily be progressively deteriorating while they are being discussed, and so we get into what the journalist describes as a "vicious spiral," and :find that situations which were manageable under ordinary circumstances get into altogether new relations and new proportions} and req uire dangerous remedies. We also find, if we do nothing, or if we try only small doses of remedies, that we may not be acting for the best. Then we know that the forces which are to be con trolled often lie beyond the boundaries of anyone nation, and affect vast populations, and yet we have not yet invented a satisfactory international control over these economic matters. We hav~ hardly invented an easy means of international inquiry and decision, to say nothing of executive action.
Science has been bringing us rapidly to a posi tion where our national boundaries are obsolete; especially, for example, in . the distribution of Ininerals which are universally required under modern conditions, and which are arbitrarily,distributed by nature without reference to such national boundaries.
The general distribution of produce has no relation lAddress delivered at a Special Convocation for the conferring of Honorary Degrees, held in Convocation Hall, University of Toronto, Friday, May 26, 1933. whatever to existing political areas; ' these existing poli tical areas are, however, becoming more, instead of less, insisten t upon their claims to regulate such matters. The world has become in ternationalized by a net-work of export industries which have to depend on foreign markets, by large overseas investmen ts which require the transport of goods in specific directions to liquidate them, and by financial obligations which do not correspond with the natural economic flow of goods, especially . where the na tural flow is found to be con trary to poE tical expediency. Small wonder, then, that the times are cri tical and responsible. Does academic life flow on serenely in its studies of human learning, oblivious of its new surroundings, or has it a new and special responsibility and special·mission in this emergency?
One is 'bound, if in a position of responsibility, to be 'profoundly sorry for the young people who are emerging from our universities in to life in a time of such difficul ty and depression. I t is an intensely personal problelu and one's regret is that there is an extraordinary absence of opportuni ty in the life to which they are going. Perhaps in many. respects what is one of the most depressing features of the depression is that it means that the optimism and the 'vigour of youth are dimmed at the very start. We should have liked to look-upon this situationthose of us in middle life and responsible stations-and to pass over the actual machinery to these young people and say, "Here is a social machine, in good running order," and without encroachment up9n our natural modesty, we would go on to say: "I commend. this to your care; you are a great deal luckier than I was, because when I . started things were not anything like as polished and excellent as now," and we should like to go on further: "Not only do we hand you the machine which is running 4 08 perfectly and in good order, but we have elaborated by experience, bitter and otherwlse, a fine set of rules and precautions which will put things right if they go wrong: learn those rules and save yourselves much trouble; we bear you up on our shoulders." Instead of that blessing, I am afraid we shall have to say to these young men and women emerging in to modern life: "Here is a complicated machine which I have invented; it is absolutely out of order; I do not know how to get it right n1yself; you must rectify it; here is your inheritance and our gift:" and then I have to add: "Not only is it out of order, -but I have no rules to hand you, because my past experience has been the very thing that has led me in to this unfortunate S1 tuation."
C~leridge said that, "Experience is like the stern lights of a ship, lighting up the track over which we have passed." So we find that experience is at a discount, and the practical man is looking around, very much at sea, because all of his rules and all of his landmarks are set at nau-ght; they are all out of place and out of date! The practical man has been described as "the man who practises the theories of thirty years ago !"
No one can hope to cope with the modern situation unless he has the basic capacity for thinking out new principles. This is a transitional age. Professor Whitehead has said that "The unstable ages are the great ages;" but they are not great if they are too unstable, and they are great only if the people in them are great. Now, this problem of to-day is three-fold; first, there is the machinery of control and direction, the political form of society which we are watching with such care, and in which we give up the ground we have gained in the historic past so grudgingly under the new conditions. Secondly, there is the mentality or intellectuality of leadership, and if I may coin a new word) of "followership."
Thirdly, there is the very important problem of the moral consistency of the people who are being governed.
In. each of these, the academic responsibilities and opportunities are to-day immense. In the first place, the pi"oblem of recovery and regaining balance 'is mainly an intellectual problem, which should give place and give way and yield its secrets to the trained intellect in sustained research and industry. In the second place, when it has recovered its' balance, this great material . world, in addition to its moral aspect, has a highly intellectu' al one, in the proper ordering and direction of its tendencies.
Democracy, in its various forms in different coun tries, was designed for the con trolling of a differen t order of problems which have elnerged as the great historic dividing lines in men's minds in the past. But it is grouping a different order of populations to-day, in density and in methods of communication) for their common action. These democratic fonns hq,ve been ideal in the past, for the leisurely working out of the problems of religious and personal Ii berty, the franchise, and C01n-Inunal life, things which were common to any community, and problems which got no worse by waiting and deliberation; but these forms are much less adaptable, in the present stage of general education, for correct ,action in foreign affairs, in matters of in ternational rela tlons.
The most important problems to-day are the economic problems, and most economic problems have now an international bearing. I walked into an Embassy in a country I cannot nalne,in a foreign nation of which I must not speak, and at a time to which it would be dangerous to allude, and found one of the staff cursing his " -DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS lot. He said: «All this diplomacy business has gone to the dogs. When I started my training in diplomatic life 'the whole matter was simple; I started learning about the balance of power and various diplomatic questions, but now everythirig we touch relates to this economic question, and! know nothing about it-this black magic of currency: I h"ave now to say whether I think this country is going to keep its presen t currency level to right its hal ance of trade, and so forth," and he pulled the remaining hair he had in desperation! That is symbolic of the_change which has taken place in the main problems with which .we have to deal. The characteristics of these problems must be laid bare before we can see the real relation of democracy to them.
First of all, economic problems, unlike so many others, have a superficial appearance which is very different from the underlying realities, and unless one can penetrate beneath the surface, he cannot naturally reach any truth about them. Then it is so often that an individual in terest, an industry, or a particular locality, is not identical with the interests of the whole country, and still less with the interests of the whole world, so one cannot tell the whole story without much study. For example, we have only to look at the problem of the division of the product of industi·y, or what I call the "size of the cake;" people are so concerned wi th increasing their proportion of the cake from "x" per cent. to "y" per cent. that they forget the influence which it may have on the whole cake, and that it is better to have ten per cent. of one thousand than twelve per cent. of eight hundred. This fallacy largely affects localities, because their actions are influenced simply by local vision, which very "often may be distorted, however honest and fair-minded.
Then there are such questions as the financiaJ power of progressive taxation; the making of people who have the larger part, pay it over, or to use the language of over the border, "soaking the rich." That may be an excellen t policy for the time being, but we should not draw definite conclusions upon it until we have exan1ined the effect upon the whole community in th-e long run. This problem involves another thing difficult for the average nian-weighing the future against the present, for how heavily the present scores and yet how desperately we can rob the future if we are not careful! The economic problem also involves weighing two different aspects of life-medium returns with regularity against high returns with variability, and these modern problems demand a knowledge of principles for the interpretation of facts. We have facts enough in our newspapers-or alleged facts-coloured facts, but, one cannot do anything with those facts if he has not principles upon which to string them, and -by which to analyze them and correct them._ Correct economic judgmen t requires a wider rangeand here I 'speak with great deference in the. face of the accumulated learning gathered here to-night-than a judgment in any other sphere because it requires the balancing of facts which are constantly changing and often obscure till their effects bring them to ligh t. I t also requires the weighing of psychological influences which vary widely in different countries and different ages. You cannot tell in the latest ecoriomic question of inflation what will happen if you do thus and so, because it will be different in France from the United States, dependent upon the intangible, the mass psychology, the response of the people. And lastly, all of your problems require what is most difficult to human nature, that is, the complete subordination of personal predilections.
If these are the characteristics of the economic 4I2 judgment, it is clear why a democratic form of government may fail to give satisfactory results . . First of all, the collective judgment does not under"': stand. You have to imagine a vast mass of people each understanding a small portion of the problem and ask yourselves where emerges the collective view or judgmen t of the whole. This collective or mass thought m.ay be deceived by appearances; it may be overborne by the most obvious facts, and miss the important ones. Again in the modern state it is quite possible that no decided vote may prevail upon which drastic action may be based., and that is perhaps the most difficult feature of all.
Then action cannot be ra·pid if it is to be decided upon by everybody. It is riot well for all the crew to go upon the bridge and say which way the vessel shall go.
The problem may be an urgent one and be subject to deterioration -while being discussed, such. as the topic of the credit of a person or country. Why, to discuss the credit of an institution or a country is like Inentioning or discussing a woman's reputation; even to talk about it incidentally is to do it no good! And then a . very. weak compromise of interests may emerge from the ballot box, and that may be completely ineffective· as a policy.
We have, therefore, to face the fact that democracy is not well equipped for the solution of economic problems as they are at present constituted. Apart from this surface question pressing on us to-day., for an immediate recovery, we have three chief underlying problems for the government of nations. Referring back to my reference to the form of govern men t-.the philosophy of government, the balance between individual liberty and social direction-most of us have firmly in the background of., our minds and almost in the fibre of our thoughts, the 413 philosophy of freedom. Now, we are constantly putting larger and larger patches of social regula tion ~pon the torn gann, ent of personal liberty. At the other end of the scale, in the Russian experiment, they are putting, in order to achieve some kind of success, larger and larger "gussets" of personal liberty into the straight jacket of communIsm. I hope I have got the word "gussets" right! Then, the second underlying problem is the ·necessity for ceding-giving up-certain aspects of national sovereign ty in economic questions, if the world is to get the best from its resources. National sovereigrity is reasserting itself in all directions, and the problem of giving up something for the common good is acute and pressing.
The third is the baffling problem of the measu~e of value, the monetary problem, which involves so many fallacies, and the practical difficulty of relating money wages to real wage costs-the problem of what to do about the money wage: whether it should remain constant, or by modification correct a nl0re or less purchasing power; or whether the attempt should be abandoned, or something else should be adjusted or-made to give wa:y . . vVe have to face such an unwelcome fact as that the attempt to move money C!f gold about the world, unless it really means moving the goods for which it stands, is bound to end sooner or later in some kind of economic disaster.
This problem of money lies at · the root of one-half of our troubles to-day. I t is known to all of us, no matter how casual our study of political economy may have been, as a medium ' of exchange, as a store of value, and as the measure of value; it is the means by which we get our goods exchanged. We know the results of exchange and of barter; nainely to pay for a tram ride with an egg and a half, or for a suit of clothes with a quarter of a cow is a most inconvenient thing for dvilization. We must exchange our produce quickly, and easily, and the medium of money is used.
If we wish to have purchasing power at hand in any direction, we do not like to keep it in the form of perishable articles-articles which may not be accepted in all directions-and we feel that if we have money in the stocking, or the tea pot, or the chimney, or even deposited in the ' bank, we have a store of value upon which we can . draw at any time. But,its main service is to measure the amount, to enable us to say what one thing is worth, not in terms of some other thing-not to say that a pound of butter is worth six eggs to-day and five eggs yesterday-but to have that mechanism by which it is possible to me·asure value, in a common measure of value. But what we do not usually recognize is that money performs the two first functions almost by mutual exclusion, for when money is being used and stored, either in stockings, in tea pots, or deposited in banks, it is not performing the other use-its use is divided between the two functions-just as you cannot Ineasure a yard with a tape measure, if a large portion of that tape measure is in your pocket! Now, the curious thing about money as a measure of value is that the measure is not absolute; it depends upon the way in which the first two uses are sharing the field, for if money is being used to create a store, and only to a minor extent as exchange mechanism, then the measure of value wil1 turn out to be quite different from what it would be if the money were used more as an exchange mechanism. The level of prices measured in n10ney will be relative to the proportions between storing and exchanging.
I realize that I have done the utmost violence to the feelings of every economist in the way in which I have simplified and expressed this, but I am showing that we are trying to do three incompatible things. This money problem is a baffling blend of purely mechanical or equational elements with psychological and emotional· elements, and upon the solution of it depends the whole possibiE ty of a competent and highly organized civilisation. I t will be brought to a severe test in this forthcoming World's Conference.
That Conference may fail from anyone of some five or six reasons: first of all, from the undue persistence of political nationalism in an economic world; secondly, from the inability to suffer any local disadvantage or changes for the greater common good; thirdly, from an inability to liquidate the past-all that great mass of contractual obligations which are over our heads, and which are now out of relation and · out of proportion. If we find it impossible to clear up that tangle, the Conference may fail.
'''hat may be a genuine difficulty among people of the greatest goodwill, and the greatest good feeling, lies in such unexplored fields as the "rules of the game" about the gold standard; and then it may fail because of its human reactions upon the people, who have to implement and stand behind its decisiDns.
It is quite true that in the end economic facts may prevail, whatever you do or think about them, but in the short run, what the people think about facts may be ,more ' important than the facts themselves. If you think that a great machine like a bank is unsafe, it becomes unsafe from the very fact that you think so. You will run as hard and fast from a dog which you think is a wolf, as you will from a real wolf! And any of the reactions which are attached to runnIng precipitately, in the 4 16 way of fa-lling over and breaking your neck, are present in both cases.
There is a vast difference between economic science and the other sciences. One can see, looking back, a golden age of physical-science, when immense strides . have been made in a few years, in such subjects as physics, chemistry, and biology, each one having a period when many first-class minds have g6ne in to it wi th great zest, and reaped tremendous harvests. So why not that of economics? Is it not time"we turned for a moment to concentrate upon economic problems from every direction? With the highest types of minds we should be able to solve these problems, and secure a golden age, because we can never get a golden age of economic life in a stone age of economic thought. Is it not time to focus upon these problems intensively in order to keep pace with the advances in other spheres, and in every other science? The advance in every other science alters the whole problem of economics, and surely concentrated and intenge minds working upon the science of economics should bring it to a higher level than it is to-day.
In the other sciences you have this curious fact, that a single brilliant brain may raise the standard of living of millions of people without any effort on their parts~ Insulin was discovered by the concen tra ted efforts of one or two men; what of the millions of people who will benefi t from it, and in the fu ture the further lnilIions who will receive it as a great inheritance straight away, without any effort on their parts? You can count hundreds of discoveries which have been made by a few brilliant brains, the results of which are being enjoyed by the whole world at -the present time. This is not so with the economics of democracy. You may have the most brilliant economic conceptions on a subject, but unless democracies are 417 willing to seize them and understand them and adopt them, you cannot raise the standard of the lives of the millions; you may have a better currency system, or a better method of protection for the products of your country, but unless the people acquiesce in these methods, or in a new monetary system, they ' cannot succeed.
What is the position of education in all of this? Well, its place in this scheme ought to be easily visible to , all of us. The time has, gone by when we can say that education is "the inculcation of the incomprehensible into the ignorant by the incompetent." Now, upon us, is the responsibility: for these complexi ties of economic life require certain qualities of judgment. vVhitehead says: "Pure men tali ty easily becomes trivial in its grasp of fact. \Nisdom's persistent pursuit of the deeper understanding is ever con fran ting intellectual systems with the importance of their omissions."
Mr. Baldwin recently told me of a certain brilliant don at Oxford who had become so peculiar, that someone pointed him out and said: "He was not made; not begotten; but just educated!"
The education of the individual, apart from the increase of the contents of the store of knowledge, had formerly a single main purpose, to make a better citizen and a more competent worker oj him. Now it has a three-fold task.
First of all, man has to do, and should do this: he should make a better governor inasmuch as he fs to control by democracy vast issues beyond his personal ken; he must, therefore, know how , to judge facts outside of his own field, and know the technique of many kinds of proof in other fields.
A third responsibility rests upon education now, because it has to meet the new problem of leisure. Moderntechnology at present is tending towards the knowledge , 4 18 which will enable a man to satisfy pure cOlnmodity wants, in a much smaller fraction of the twenty-four hours. In the last one hundred years the commodity standard has increased four:"fold, with a much shorter working day. Conditions to-day are very different from what they were in days gone by, when spare time was continually and . preponderan tly taken up in the production and acq uisi tion of ever-new commodities. Now in any case, new supplies would be meaningless without increased time of leisure in which to enjoy them. What is the use of having a house suffocatingly full of new commodities,i£ we work as they worked ' one hundred years ago, and have no time to use them or understand them? But leisure is novv emerging which is really just as necessary to satisfy hurpan needs as any commodity. We must get out of the habit of supposing that every hour freed by ' science from producing existing products n1ust be re-engaged in producing new goods. We are now fumbling at the problem of employing some people all the day, and others not at all. \Ve cannot solve this problem by giving an unreduced money wage to those who are emptoyed, but by reducing their employment in order to employ the remainder. But wl:ten we do succeed in finding the equilibrium, th~n this third task of education will stand clear; it will be a better producer of citizens, wiser voters, and better loiterers.
Education develops into the academic life, when the student tackles the salutary task of establishing a single fact; when the student learns the technique of proof and evidence in different , fields of knowledge, instead of stumbling out of the law school, for instance, and trying instinctively to apply the laws of evidence to theology; or when he comes from the test tubes, endeavouring to apply the learning he has received there to the technique of the origin of the New Testament or similar problems. 'Educatlon .involves a far better understanding of the technique of proof in different fields of though t, when facts ,develop. I read the other day that the real coming of age of a man was the conscious use of his power in any situation in life.
So the problem for the rising generation is to establish this essential trin' ity, the democratic, the economic, and the academic, and what the universitYchas to do is to give those emerging graduates a "map of life," and to inspire its students with the philosophy of life, which, after all, is the greatest gift of the university.
To the young men and women here to-night, may I say that to me life is perfectly wonderful so long as you do not take ' it too much for granted. ' We want boys to awaken to a sense of obligations to others. This modern problem is largely created by the mass of huma~ beings who are ful1-y aware of the advantages to be derived from communal life, but with very inlperfect views of their obligations to it. John Stuart Mill said that one' person with a belief has a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests. , Then the universi ty has a delusion to dispel. I t'is the delusion that life and society are naturally stable, with periods of change which have to be justified. Why, the very accommodation to change, without destruction, has a psychological technique all its own. I do not mean to suggest that fidgeting is progress, or that all motion is progress; there is such a thing as motion on hinges, as well as motion by progress, as Lord Oxford has' said. There is the delusion that the onus of justification must always be on the side of change, th~t we should do nothing about anything, that it must be quite right until somebody can prove something to the contrary, that we should, "stand ' pat," as the correct attitude of the careful thoughtful judgment, until argument and circums'tances are too 'much for it. If ever these delusions stand exposed} they do to-day. The task 'of academic life is to justify that penetra ting remark of Robert Bridges, when he said, _ "stability is bu't balance" for we are engaged in "the mas terrul adminis tra tion of the unforeseen."
